Kemerovo, Kemerovo, Russian Federation
Kemerovo, Kemerovo, Russian Federation
The article explores the possibility that the subjects of managerial decision-making have an objective need for the institutionalization of corruption. The authors consider the issues of integrating institutional corruption into the managerial and political-legal subsystems, which leads to multiple functional distortions in the system of state institutions in the interests of latent structures. The purpose of the article is a comparative analysis of the two main types of corruption in modern society. The authors use a neo-institutional methodological approach characterized by the principle of methodological individualism and a number of scientific methods. Although market corruption exerts a certain financial burden on business, it does not violate the principles of market competition. Institutional corruption may hypothetically not impose additional financial burden on business, but it introduces significant restrictions on the competitive environment itself. Progress in the fight against corruption is possible only if civil society interacts with state authorities and institutions, and the values of civic activism are actualized in the socio-political participation of citizens.
corruption, nepotism, neopatrimonialism, clientele, clan, political culture, civil society, legal awareness
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